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Abstract. We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA)
and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototyp-
ical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give bounds on the
space of feasible mechanisms with respect to the above metrics, and
observe that two fundamental mechanisms, namely the First-Price (FP)
and the Second-Price (SP), lie on the two opposite extrema of this bound-
ary. Furthermore, for the natural class of anonymous task-independent
mechanisms, we completely characterize the PoA/PoS Pareto frontier;
we design a class of optimal mechanisms SPα that lie exactly on this
frontier. In particular, these mechanisms range smoothly, with respect
to parameter α ≥ 1 across the frontier, between the First-Price (SP1)
and Second-Price (SP∞) mechanisms.
En route to these results, we also provide a definitive answer to an
important question related to the scheduling problem, namely whether
non-truthful mechanisms can provide better makespan guarantees in the
equilibrium, compared to truthful ones. We answer this question in the
negative, by proving that the Price of Anarchy of all scheduling mecha-
nisms is at least n, where n is the number of machines.
Keywords: Mechanism design · Price of Anarchy · Price of Stability ·
Pareto Frontier.
1 Introduction
The field of algorithmic mechanism design was established in the seminal pa-
per of Nisan and Ronen [15] and has ever since been at the centre of research
in the intersection of economics and computer science. The research agenda
put forward in [15] advocates the study of approximate solutions to interesting
optimization problems, in settings where rational agents are in control of the
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input parameters. More concretely, the authors of [15] proposed a framework in
which, not unlike classical approaches in approximation algorithms, algorithms
that operate under certain limitations are evaluated in terms of their approx-
imation ratio. In particular, in algorithmic mechanism design, this constraint
comes from the requirement that agents should have the right incentives to al-
ways report their inputs truthfully. The corresponding algorithms, paired with
appropriately chosen payment functions, are called mechanisms.
Another pioneering line of work, initiated by Koutsoupias [12] and popular-
ized further by Roughgarden [18], studies the inefficiency of games through the
notion of the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which measures the deterioration of some
objective at the worst-case Nash equilibrium. A more optimistic version of the
same principle, where the inefficiency is measured at the best equilibrium, was
introduced in [1], under the name of Price of Stability (PoS).
Given the straightforward observation that mechanisms induce games be-
tween the agents that control their inputs, as well as the fact that truthfulness is
typically a very demanding property, an alternative approach to the framework
of Nisan and Ronen [15] is to design mechanisms that perform well in the equi-
librium, i.e., they provide good PoA or PoS guarantees. This approach has been
adopted, among others, by central papers in the field (e.g., see [17] and refer-
ences therein) and is by now as much a part of algorithmic mechanism design as
the original framework of [15]. An interesting question that has arisen in many
settings is whether non-truthful mechanisms (evaluated at the worst-case equi-
librium, in terms of their PoA) can actually outperform truthful ones (evaluated
at the truth-telling, dominant strategy equilibrium), for a given objective.
While the literature that studies the concepts of PoA and PoS is long and
extensive, there seems to be a lack of a systematic approach investigating the
trade-off between the two notions simultaneously. More concretely, given a prob-
lem in algorithmic mechanism design, it seems quite natural to explore not only
the best mechanisms in terms of the two notions independently, but also the
mechanisms that achieve the best trade-off between the two. In a sense, this
approach concerns a “tighter” optimality notion, as among a set of mechanisms
with an “acceptable” Price of Anarchy guarantee, we would like to identify the
ones that provide the best possible Price of Stability. Our main contribution in
the current paper is the proposal of such a research agenda and its application
on the canonical problem in the field, introduced in the seminal work of Nisan
and Ronen [15], that of scheduling on unrelated machines.
1.1 Our Contributions
PoA/PoS trade-off: We propose the research agenda of studying systematically
the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability in algorith-
mic mechanism design. Specifically, given a problem at hand and an objective
function, we are interested in the trade-off between the PoA and the PoS of
mechanisms for the given objective. We apply this approach on the prototypi-
cal problem of algorithmic mechanism design studied in [15], that of unrelated
machine scheduling, where the machines are self-interested agents.
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First, in Section 3, for the class of all possible mechanisms, we prove that PoA
guarantees imply corresponding PoS lower bounds and vice-versa (Theorem 2),
which allows us to quantify the possible trade-off between the two inefficiency
notions in terms of a feasible region (see Fig. 1); we refer to the boundary of this
region as the inefficiency boundary. Interestingly, two well-known mechanisms,
namely the First-Price and the Second-Price mechanisms, turn out to lie on the
extreme points of this boundary.
Next, in Section 4, for the well-studied class of task-independent and anony-
mous mechanisms, we are able to show a tighter feasibility region (Theorem 5).
As a matter of fact, its inefficiency boundary turns out to completely character-
ize the achievable trade-off between the PoA and the PoS: we design a class of
mechanisms (Section 4.2) called SPα, parameterized by a quantity α, which are
optimal in the sense that for any possible trade-off between the two inefficiency
notions, there exists a mechanism in the class (i.e., an appropriate choice of α)
that exactly achieves this trade-off (Theorem 6). In other words, we obtain an
exact description of the Pareto frontier of inefficiency (see Fig. 2).
Our SPα mechanisms are simple and intuitive and are based on the idea
of setting reserve prices relatively to the declarations of the fastest machines.
While this is clearly not truthful, we prove that it induces the equilibria which
are desirable for our results. More precisely, the choice of α enables us to “control”
the set of possible equilibria in a way that allows us to achieve any trade-off on
the boundary.
The Price of Anarchy of scheduling: Our results also offer insights in an other
interesting direction. The inefficiency boundary result for general mechanisms is
based on a novel monotonicity lemma (Lemma 1), which is quite different from
the well-known weak monotonicity property [19]. Interestingly, we also use this
lemma to prove a general lower bound of n on the PoA of any mechanism for the
scheduling problem (Theorem 1), where n is the number of machines. This re-
sult contributes to the intriguing debate [11,10,4] of whether general mechanisms
(that may be non-truthful, evaluated at the worst-case equilibrium) can outper-
form truthful ones (evaluated at the truth-telling equilibrium). Given that the
best known truthful mechanism achieves an n-approximation, our results here
provide a definitive, negative answer to the aforementioned question. As a matter
of fact, in Theorem 4, we actually show that when evaluated at their worst-case
equilibrium, truthful mechanisms are bound to perform even more poorly, as
their PoA is unbounded.
Due to space constraints, all omitted proofs can be found in the full version
of the paper [8].
1.2 Related Work
The (Selfish) Scheduling Problem: The scheduling problem on unrelated self-
ish machines is the prototypical problem studied by Nisan and Ronen [15] in
1999, when they introduced the field of algorithmic mechanism design. The au-
thors consider the worst-case performance of truthful mechanisms on dominant
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strategy, truth-telling equilibria, and discover that the well-known Second-Price
auction5 has an approximation ratio of n for the problem, where n is the number
of machines. Despite several attempts over the years, this is still the best-known
truthful mechanism. On the other hand, the succession of the best proven lower
bounds started with 2 in [15], improved to 2.41 in [5] and finally to 2.61 in [13]. In-
terestingly, Ashlagi et al. [2] showed a matching lower bound of n for anonymous
mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that do not take the identities of the machines into
account) and whether there is a better mechanism that is not anonymous is still
the most prominent open problem in the area.
The Truthful Setting vs the Strategic Setting: As we mentioned earlier, given that
truthfulness is a very demanding requirement which imposes strict constraints
on the allocation and payment functions, it is an interesting direction to consider
whether non-truthful mechanisms could perform better, when evaluated in the
worst-case equilibrium. In other words, for a given problem, one could ask the
following question:
“Do there exist (non-truthful) mechanisms whose Price of Anarchy out-
performs the approximation ratio guarantee of all truthful mechanisms?”.
To differentiate, we will refer to the traditional approach of Nisan and Ronen [15]
as the truthful setting and to the setting where all mechanisms are explored (with
respect to their Nash equilibria) as the strategic setting.
Koutsoupias [11] studied the truthful setting for the problem of unrelated
machine scheduling without money but he explicitly advocated the strategic
setting as a future direction. This was later pursued in Giannakopoulos, Kout-
soupias and Kyropoulou [10] for the same problem, where the authors answered
the aforementioned question in the affirmative. The same approach was taken
in [4] following the results of [7] on the limitations of truthful mechanisms for
indivisible item allocation. In the literature of auctions, the strategic setting was
studied even in domains for which an optimal truthful mechanism (the VCG
mechanism) exists, motivated by the fact that non-truthful mechanisms are be-
ing employed in practice, with the Generalized Second-Price auction used by
Google for the Adwords allocation being a prominent example [3]. We refer the
reader to the survey of Roughgarden [17] for more details.
Somewhat surprisingly, although the exploration of different solution con-
cepts besides dominant strategy equilibria was already explicitly mentioned as a
future direction in [15], the strategic setting for the scheduling problem was not
studied before our paper. As we mentioned earlier, the answer to the highlighted
question above here is negative, but the setting proved out to be quite rich in
terms of the achievable trade-off between the two different inefficiency notions.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that proposes the sys-
tematic study of the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of
Stability. While preparing our manuscript, we became aware that a trade-off
5 In the related literature, this mechanism is often referred to as the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism.
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between the two notions was very recently considered also in [16], though in
a fundamentally different setting: the authors of [16] study a special case of
covering games, originally introduced by Gairing [9], which is not inherently a
mechanism design setup. One the contrary, our interest is in explicitly studying
this trade-off in the area of algorithmic mechanism design, thus choosing the
prototypical scheduling problem as the starting point.
2 Model and Notation
Let R≥0 = [0,∞) denote the nonnegative reals and N = {1, 2, . . . } the posi-
tive integers. For any n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the strategic scheduling
problem (on unrelated machines), there is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of machines (or
agents) and a set J = {1, . . . ,m} of tasks. Each machine i has a processing time
(or cost) ti,j ≥ 0 for task j. The induced matrix t ∈ Rn×m≥0 is the profile of pro-
cessing times. For convenience, we will denote by ti = (ti,1, . . . , ti,m) the vector
of processing times of machine i for the tasks and by tj = (t1,j , . . . , tn,j)T the
vector of processing times of the machines for task j, so that t = (t1, . . . , tn) =
(t1, . . . , tm)T. The machines are strategic and therefore, when asked, they do
not necessarily report their true processing times t but they rather use strate-
gies s ∈ Rn×m≥0 . To emphasize the distinction, we will often refer to t as the profile
of true processing times. Adopting standard game-theoretic notation, we use t−i
and s−i to denote the profile of true or reported processing times respectively,
without the coordinates of the i’th machine.
A (deterministic, direct revelation) mechanism M = (x,p) gets as input
a strategy profile s ∈ Rn×m reported by the machines and outputs allocation
x = x(s) ∈ {0, 1}n×m and payment p = p(s) ∈ Rn≥0: xi,j is an indicator variable
denoting whether or not task j is allocated to machine j, and pi is the payment
with whichM compensates machine i for taking part in the mechanism. Thus,
the allocation rule needs to satisfy
∑
i∈N xi,j(s) = 1 for all tasks j.
The utility of machine i under a mechanismM = (x,p), given true running
times ti and a reported profile s by the machines, is
uMi (s|ti) = pi(s)−
m∑
j=1
xi,j(s)ti,j ,
that is, the payment she receives from M minus the total workload she has
to execute. This is exactly the reason why machines may lie about their true
processing times; they will change their report si and deviate to another s′i if this
improves the above quantity. A stable solution with respect to such best-response
selfish behaviour is captured by the well-known notion of an equilibrium. Given
a mechanism M and a strategy profile s, we will say that s is a (pure Nash)
equilibrium6 ofM (with respect to a true profile t) if, for every machine i and
6 We will be interested in pure Nash equilibria in this paper; we provide a discussion
on different solution concepts in the full version.
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every possible deviation s′i ∈ Rm≥0,
uMi (s|t) ≥ uMi (s′i, s−i|t).
Let QMt denote the set of pure Nash equilibria of mechanism M with respect
to true profile t. As is standard in the literature, we focus on the case where
QMt 6= ∅ for all t ∈ Rn×m≥0 (see, e.g.,[15,4,10]).
Our objective is to design mechanisms that minimize the makespan
CM(s|t) = max
i∈N
m∑
j=1
xi,j(s)ti,j ,
that is, the total completion time if our machines run in parallel. For a matrix
t of running times, let OPT(t) denote the optimum makespan, i.e., OPT(t) =
minymaxi∈N
∑m
j=1 yi,jti,j where y ranges over all feasible allocation of tasks to
machines. It is a well-known phenomenon that equilibria can result in suboptimal
solutions, and the following, extensively studied, notions where introduced to
quantify exactly this discrepancy: the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of
Stability (PoS) of a scheduling mechanismM on n machines are, respectively,
PoA(M) = sup
m∈N,t∈Rn×m≥0
sups∈QMt C
M(s|t)
OPT(t)
PoS(M) = sup
m∈N,t∈Rn×m≥0
infs∈QMt C
M(s|t)
OPT(t)
.
For simplicity, we will sometimes drop theM, t and s in the notation intro-
duced in this section, whenever it is clear which mechanism and which true or
reported profile we are referring to.
2.1 Task-Independent Mechanisms
For a significant part of this paper, we will focus on the class of anonymous,
task-independent mechanisms. This is a rather natural class of mechanisms; as
a matter of fact, two of the arguably most well-studied and used mechanisms in
practice, namely the First-Price and Second-Price, lie within this class.
Definition 1 (Task-independence). A mechanismM = (x,p) is called task-
independent if each one of its tasks is allocated independently of the others.
Formally, there exists a collection of single-task mechanisms {Aj}j=1,...,m, Aj =
(yj ,qj), such that, for any task j, any machine i, and for any strategy profile s,
xj(s) = yj(sj) and pi(s) =
m∑
j=1
qji (s
j).
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We will refer to the single-task mechanisms Aj of the above definition as the
components of M. It is important to notice here that the definition does not
require the mechanism to necessarily use the same component for all the tasks.
Another standard property in the literature of the problem is anonymity. The
property can be defined generally (e.g., see [11,2]), but here we will define it for
task-independent mechanisms. Since we are dealing with potentially non-truthful
mechanisms, we need to handle the notion of anonymity in a more delicate way,
in order to appropriately deal with ties.7
Definition 2 (Anonymity). A single-task mechanism A = (x,p) is anony-
mous if, for any permutation of the reports:
– The winning agent is permuted in the same way and receives the same pay-
ment. If there are multiple agents with the same bid, the winner is chosen to
be the one with the largest index.8
– The payments of the agents that did not receive the task are permuted the
same way. Additionally, losing agents with the same report receive the same
payment.
Formally, for any inputs s, s˜ such that s˜ = pi(s) for some permutation pi, if si? is
the report of the winner in s, then the winner in s˜ has index max{i ∈ N |s˜i = si?}.
Additionally, let pi′ be any permutation such that s˜ = pi′(s) = pi(s). For any i 6= i?
we have ppi(i)(s˜) = ppi′(i)(s˜) = pi(s). In particular, if all entries in s are distinct:
x(s˜) = pi(x(s)) and p(s˜) = pi(p(s)).
A task-independent mechanism M is anonymous, if all its components are
anonymous (single-task) mechanisms.
Perhaps the simplest and most natural mechanism that one can think of is
the following, which assigns the task to the fastest machine (according to the
declared processing times) and pays her her declaration.
Definition 3 (First-Price (FP) mechanism). Assign each task j to the
fastest machine ι(j) for it, i.e. ι(j) ∈ argmini∈N si,j (breaking ties arbitrar-
ily), paying her her declared running time sι(i),j; pay the remaining N \ {ι(j)}
machines 0 for task j.
Second-Price mechanisms have also been extensively studied and applied in
auction theory, but also in strategic scheduling.
Definition 4 (Second-Price (SP) mechanism). Assign each task j to the
fastest machine ι(j) for it, i.e., ι(j) ∈ argmini∈N si,j (breaking ties arbitrar-
ily), paying her the declared processing time of the second-fastest machine, i.e.
mini∈N\{ι(j)} si,j; pay the remaining N \ {ι(j)} machines 0 for task j.
7 For a more detailed discussion of anonymity and tie-breaking, see Remark 1 of the
full version.
8 This is without loss of generality for our results; the tie-breaking could be any fixed
total order on the machines that does not depend on the reports.
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Notice that both FP and SP mechanisms are task-independent and anony-
mous. Furthermore, SP is truthful. For a more detailed discussion on the con-
nection between the different solution concepts (truthfulness vs Nash equilibria)
and inefficiency notions (Price of Anarchy vs Price of Stability vs approximation
ratio), we refer the reader to Section 2.2 of the full version.
3 The Inefficiency of All Mechanisms
We start with a lower bound of n for the Price of Anarchy of the scheduling
problem, which applies to all mechanisms. The lower bound will be based on
the following monotonicity lemma. We note that this monotonicity property is
different from the weak monotonicity (WMON) used in the literature of truthful
machine scheduling, in the sense that (a) it is global, whereas WMON is local
and (b) it applies to the relation between the true processing times and the
equilibria of the mechanism, rather than the actual allocations.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Monotonicity). Let M be any mechanism for the
scheduling problem. Let t be a profile of true processing times and let s ∈ Qt be
an equilibrium under t. Denote by Si the set of tasks assigned to machine i by
M on input s. Consider any profile tˆ such that for every machine i, tˆi,j ≤ ti,j
if j ∈ Si and tˆi,j ≥ ti,j if j /∈ Si. Then s ∈ Qtˆ, i.e., s is an equilibrium under tˆ
as well.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that s /∈ Qtˆ, which means that for the profile of
processing times tˆ, there exists some machine i that has a beneficial deviation
s′i, i.e., ui(s′i, s−i|tˆ) > ui(s|tˆ). Let S′i be the set of tasks assigned to machine
i under report s′ = (s′i, s−i) (and underlying true reports tˆ). The difference in
utility for machine i between profiles s′ and s is
∆ui(tˆ) ≡ ui(s′|tˆ)− ui(s|tˆ) = pi(s′)− pi(s) +
∑
j∈Si\S′i
tˆi,j −
∑
j∈S′i\Si
tˆi,j .
By the fact that s′i is a beneficial deviation, it holds that ∆ui(tˆ) > 0. Now
consider the profile of processing times t and the same deviation s′i of machine
i. The increase in utility now is
∆ui(t) = pi(s
′)− pi(s) +
∑
j∈Si\S′i
ti,j −
∑
j∈S′i\Si
ti,j ≥ pi(s′)− pi(s)
+
∑
j∈Si\S′i
tˆi,j −
∑
j∈S′i\Si
tˆi,j = ∆ui(tˆ),
which holds because ti,j ≥ tˆi,j , if j ∈ Si and ti,j ≤ tˆi,j , if j /∈ Si. This implies
that ∆ui(t) > 0, which contradicts the fact that s ∈ Qt. uunionsq
Using this lemma, we can prove our first lower bound:
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Theorem 1. For any scheduling mechanismM for n machines, it must be that
PoA(M) ≥ n.
Proof. LetM be any mechanism and consider a profile of true processing times
t with n machines and n2 tasks, where ti,j = 1 for all machines i and all tasks
j. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be a pure Nash equilibrium of M under t. For each
machine i, let Si be the set of tasks assigned to that machine and note that there
exists some machine k for which |Sk| ≥ n. Let Tk ⊆ Sk be any subset of Sk such
that |Tk| = n.
Now consider the following profile tˆ of processing times:
– For all i 6= k, tˆi,j = 0, for all j ∈ Si and tˆi,j = ti,j , for all j /∈ Si.
– tˆkj = 0, for all j ∈ Sk\Tk and tˆkj = tk,j , for all j /∈ Sk\Tk.
By Lemma 1, the profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a pure Nash equilibrium under
tˆ and the allocation is the same as before, for a makespan of at least n, since
machine k is assigned all the tasks in Tk. The optimal allocation will assign one
task from Tk to each machine, the tasks from Si to machine i for each i 6= k and
the tasks from Sk\Tk to machine k, for a total makespan of 1 and the Price of
Anarchy bound follows. uunionsq
3.1 PoA/PoS Trade-off
In this section, we prove our main theorem regarding the trade-off between the
Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. The theorem informally says that if
the Price of Anarchy of a mechanism is small, then its Price of Stability has to
be high.
Theorem 2. For any scheduling mechanism M for n ≥ 2 machines, and any
positive real α,
PoA(M) < α =⇒ PoS(M) ≥ n− 1
α
+ 1.
By allowing α in Theorem 2 to grow arbitrarily large, we get the following:
Corollary 1. Even for just two machines, if a scheduling mechanism has an
optimal Price of Stability of 1, then its Price of Anarchy has to be unboundedly
large.
From the results of the section, as well as the trivial fact that PoA(M) ≥
PoS(M) for any mechanism M, we obtain a feasibility trade-off between the
PoA and the PoS of scheduling mechanisms, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. We
refer to the boundary of the shaded feasible region as the inefficiency boundary ;
the shape of the boundary follows from Theorem 2, as well as Theorem 1, since
for PoS(M) > 2 − 1n (or, in the language of Theorem 2, for α < n), the best
(i.e. largest) lower bound on the PoA is now given by Theorem 1.
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1 2− 1
n
n
1
n
FP
SP
PoS
P
o
A
Theorem 1
Theorem 2
PoA ≥ PoS
Fig. 1. The inefficiency boundary for general mechanisms, given by Theorem 2 (red
line). Combined with the global PoA lower bound of Theorem 1 (green line) and the
trivial fact that the PoS is at most the PoA (blue line), we finally get the grey feasible
region.
Mechanisms on the Extrema of the Inefficiency Boundary: When look-
ing for mechanisms on the Pareto frontier, the first ones that come to mind
are perhaps the First-Price (FP) and Second-Price (SP) mechanisms, defined in
Section 2, which are straightforward adaptations of the well-known First-Price
auction and Second-Price auction mechanisms from the auction literature.
It follows from known results in the literature for the First-Price auction (see,
e.g., [6]) that in every pure Nash equilibrium of the FP, each task is allocated to
the machine with the smallest true processing time for the task. For the Second-
Price mechanism, again it follows from known observations in the literature that
while the mechanism is truthful, it has several other pure Nash equilibria as
well. More precisely, for a task j ∈ J and any machine i ∈ N , there exists an
equilibrium for which task j is allocated to machine i. Therefore, we have the
following.
Theorem 3. For the First-Price mechanism, the PoA and the PoS are both n.
For the Second-Price mechanism, the PoA of the mechanism is unbounded and
the PoS is 1.
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Both the First-Price mechanism and the Second-Price mechanism will be ob-
tained as corner-case mechanisms in the class that we will define in Section 4.2.
Interestingly, it turns out that the bad PoA bound for the Second-Price Mech-
anism is a inherent characteristic of all truthful mechanisms. In other words, if
one is interested in the set of all equilibria, they would have to reach out beyond
truthful mechanisms.
Theorem 4. The Price of Anarchy of any truthful mechanism is unbounded.
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, it is clear that both FP and SP lie on the
boundary of the PoA/PoS feasibility space (see Fig. 1).
4 The Pareto Frontier of Task-Independent Mechanisms
As we noted in the previous section, both the SP and FP mechanisms, which lie
on the inefficiency boundary (see Fig. 1), are anonymous task-independent mech-
anisms. In this section, we will construct a tighter boundary on the PoA/PoS
trade-off for the class of anonymous task-independent mechanisms. Furthermore,
we will show that this boundary is actually tight, by designing a class of optimal
mechanisms that lie exactly on it, meaning that for each point on the bound-
ary, there is a mechanism in our class that achieves the corresponding PoA/PoS
trade-off. Thus, this results in a complete characterization of the Pareto frontier
between the PoA and the PoS. For an illustration, see Fig. 2.
4.1 PoA/PoS Trade-off
We start with the theorem that gives us the improved boundary on the space
of feasible task-independent and anonymous mechanisms. This is the red line
in Fig. 2.
Theorem 5. For any task-independent anonymous scheduling mechanism M
for n machines, and any real α > 1,
PoA(M) < (n− 1)α+ 1 =⇒ PoS(M) ≥ (n− 1)
α
+ 1.
4.2 Optimal Mechanisms on the Pareto Frontier
Next, we will design a class of mechanisms, parameterized by a quantity α that
will populate, in a smooth way, the boundary given by Theorem 5. Thus, these
mechanisms achieve trade-offs that lie on the Pareto frontier of inefficiency for
the class of task-independent and anonymous mechanisms.
Definition 5 (Second-Price mechanism with α-relative reserve price
(SPα)). For α ≥ 1, SPα is the task-independent mechanism that, for each
task j: finds a machine k ∈ argmini∈N si,j and sets a reserve price at r =
α · sk,j; assigns the task to the fastest machine ι(j) ∈ argmini∈N si,j (breaking
ties-arbitrarily); pays machine ι(j) the amount min{mini∈N\{ι(j)} si,j , r}; pays
nothing to the remaining machines N \ ι(j).
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1 n
1
n
SP1
SP∞
SPα
PoS
P
o
A
Theorem 5
PoA ≥ PoS
Theorem 2
Fig. 2. The inefficiency boundary, for anonymous task-independent mechanisms, given
by Theorem 5 (red line). Combined with the global PoA lower bound of Theorem 1
(green line) and the trivial fact that the PoS is at most the PoA (blue line), we finally
get the grey feasible region. The family of mechanisms SPα described in Section 4.2 lies
exactly on this boundary (red line), thus completely characterizing the Pareto frontier
in a smooth way with respect to parameter α ≥ 1: on its one end (α = 1) is the First-
Price mechanism FP = SP1 and at the other (α → ∞) the Second-Price mechanism
SP = SP∞.
Informally, for each task j, the mechanism sets a reserve price which is α times
larger than the smallest declared processing time, allocates the task to the fastest
machine (according to the declarations) and pays the machine the minimum of
the second-smallest declared processing time and the reserve price. What this
mechanism achieves in terms of the equilibria that it induces is the following:
assume that we create a bucket of tasks with true processing times at most α
times larger than the smallest true processing time. Then, in every equilibrium of
the mechanism, task j is allocated to some machine in the bucket and moreover,
for any machine in the bucket, there exists some equilibrium under which SPα
allocates the task to that machine (see the full version for a formal handling of
this intuition). Referencing our discussion in Section 3.1, we remark that in the
case of FP = SP1, the bucket contains only the fastest machine(s) for the task,
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and in the case of SP = SP∞, the bucket contains the whole set of machines.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 6. For SPα on n machines,
– the Price of Anarchy is at most (n− 1)α+ 1,
– the Price of Stability is at most n−1α + 1.
5 Discussion and Future Directions
On a general level, one could follow our agenda of studying the inefficiency
trade-off between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability for many other
problems in algorithmic mechanism design, such as auctions [14,20], machine
scheduling without money [11,10], or resource allocation [4], to name a few, for
which the two inefficiency notions have already been studied separately.
In terms of the strategic scheduling setting, our work gives rise to a plethora
of intriguing questions for future work, both on a technical and a conceptual level.
The major open question is whether there exists a mechanism that achieves a
better trade-off than that of Theorem 5, or in other words,
“Is the yellow region of Fig. 2 empty or not?”
If such a mechanism exists, it will most probably not be task-independent. An-
other question is whether we can remove anonymity from the statement for
task-independent mechanisms. In that regard, we have come close, as captured
by the following theorem.
Theorem 7. For any task-independent scheduling mechanism M for n ma-
chines, and real α > 1,
PoA(M) < (n− 1) α√
2
+ 1 =⇒ PoS(M) ≥ (n− 1)
α
√
2
+ 1.
Another natural direction would be to consider different equilibrium notions,
beyond pure Nash equilibria, or randomized scheduling mechanisms. We refer
the reader to the discussion of the full version for a more insightful discussion of
these avenues for future work.
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